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1 Introduction
Do not imagine, any more than I can bring myself to imag-
ine, that I should be right in undertaking so great and
difficult a task. Remembering what I said at first about
probability, I will do my best to give as probable an expla-
nation as any other – or rather, more probable; and I will
first go back to the beginning and try to speak of each thing
and of all.
Plato, ca. 367 B.C. [68]
The purpose of a philosophically consistent axiomatic foundation of mod-
ern theoretical physicsis is to provide precise mathematical concepts which
are free of undefined terms and match all concepts that physicists use to
describe their experiments and their theory, in sufficiently close correspon-
dence to reproduce at least that part of physics that is amenable to numerical
verification.
This paper is concerned with giving a concise, self-contained foundation
(more carefully than usual, and without reference to measurement) by defin-
ing the concepts of quantities, ensembles, and experiments, and showing how
they give rise to the traditional postulates and nonclasssical features of quan-
tum mechanics.
Since it is not clear a priori what it means to ‘observe’ something, and since
numbers like the fine structure constant or decay rates can be observed in na-
ture but are only indirectly related to what is traditionally called an ‘observ-
able’, we avoid using this notion and employ the more neutral term ‘quantity’
to denote quantum operators of interest.
One of the basic premises of this work is that the split between classical
physics and quantum physics should be as small as possible. We argue that
the differences between classical mechanics and quantum mechanics cannot
lie in an assumed intrinsic indeterminacy of quantum mechanics contrasted
to deterministic classical mechanics. The only difference between classical
mechanics and quantum mechanics in the latter’s lack of commutativity.
Except in the examples, our formalism never distinguishes between the clas-
sical and the quantum situation. Thus it can be considered as a consequent
implementation of Bohr’s correspondence principle. This also has didactical
advantages for teaching: Students can be trained to be acquainted at first
with the formalism by means of intuitive, primarily classical examples. Later,
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without having to unlearn anything, they can apply the same formalism to
quantum phenomena.
Of course, much of what is done here is based on common wisdom in quan-
tum mechanics; see, e.g., Jammer [39, 40], Jauch [41], Messiah [52], von
Neumann [58]. However, apart from being completely rigorous and using
no undefined terms, the overall setting, the starting points, and the interpre-
tation of known results are novel. In particular, the meaning of the concepts
is slightly shifted, carefully crafted and fixed in a way that minimizes the
differences between the classical and quantum case.
To motivate the conceptual foundation and to place it into context, I found
it useful to embed the formalism into my philosophy of physics, while strictly
separating the mathematics by using a formal definition-example-theorem-
proof exposition style. Though I present my view generally without using
subjunctive formulations or qualifying phrases, I do not claim that this is
the only way to understand physics. However, it is an excellent way to un-
derstand physics, integrating different points of view. I believe that my philo-
sophical view is fully consistent with the mathematical formalism of quantum
mechanics and accommodates naturally a number of puzzling questions about
the nature of the world.
The stochastic contents of quantum theory is determined by the restrictions
noncommutativity places upon the preparation of experiments. Since the
information going into the preparation is always extrapolated from finitely
many observations in the past, it can only be described in a statistical way,
i.e., by ensembles.
Ensembles are defined by extending to noncommuting quantities Whittle’s
[83] elegant expectation approach to classical probability theory. This ap-
proach carries no connotation of unlimited repeatability; hence it can be ap-
plied to unique systems such as the universe. The weak law of large numbers
relates abstract ensembles and concrete mean values over many instances of
quantities with the same stochastic behavior within a single system.
Precise concepts and traditional results about complementarity, uncertainty
and nonlocality follow with a minimum of technicalities. In particular, non-
local correlations predicted by Bell [2] and first detected by Aspect [1]
are shown to be already consequences of the nature of quantum mechani-
cal ensembles and do not depend on hidden variables or on counterfactual
reasoning.
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The concept of probability itself is derived from that of an ensemble by
means of a formula motivated from classical ensembles that can be described
as a finite weighted mean of properties of finitely many elementary events.
Probabilities are introduced in a generality supporting so-called effects, a
sort of fuzzy events (related to POV measures that play a significant role
in measurement theory; see Busch et al. [10, 11], Davies [16], Peres
[66]). The weak law of large numbers provides the relation to the frequency
interpretation of probability. As a special case of the definition, one gets
without any effort the well-known squared probability amplitude formula for
transition probabilities.
To separate the conceptual foundations from the thorny issue of how the pro-
cess of performing an experiment affects observations, we formalize the no-
tion of an experiment by taking into account only their most obvious aspect,
and define experiments as partial mappings that provide objective reference
values for certain quantities. Sharpness of quantities is defined in terms of
laws for the reference values; in particular the squaring law that requires
the value of a squared sharp quantity f to be equal to the squared value
of f . It is shown that the values of sharp quantities must belong to their
spectrum, and that requiring all quantities to be sharp produces contradic-
tions for Hilbert spaces of dimension > 3. This is related to well-known
no-go theorems for hidden variables. (However, recent constructive results
by Clifton & Kent [15] show that in the finite-dimensional case there are
experiments with a dense set of sharp quantities.)
An analysis of a well-known macroscopic reference value, the center of mass,
leads us to reject sharpness as a requirement for consistent experiments.
Considering the statistical foundations of thermodynamics, we are instead
lead to the view that consistent experiments should have the properites of an
ensemble. With such consistent experiments, the weak law of large numbers
explains the emergence of classical properties for macroscopic systems.
Quantum reality with reference values defined by consistent experiments is
as well-behaved and objective as classical macroscopic reality with reference
values defined by a mass-weighted average over constituent values, and lacks
sharpness (in the sense of our definition) to the same extent as classical
macroscopic reality. In this interpretation, quantum objects are intrinsically
extended objects; e.g., the reference radius of a hydrogen atom in the ground
state is 1.5 times the Bohr radius.
Thus consistent experiments provide an elegant solution to the reality prob-
4
lem, confirming the insistence of the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation on
that there is nothing but ensembles, while avoiding its elusive reality picture.
Reamrkably, the close analogy between classical and quantum physics ex-
tends even to the deepest level of physics: As shown in [57], classical field
theory and quantum field theory become almost twin brothers when con-
sidered in terms of Poisson algebras, which give a common framework for
the dynamics of both classical and quantum systems. (Here we only scratch
the surface, discussing in Section 11 the more foundational aspects of the
dynamics.)
Acknowledgments. I’d like to thank Waltraud Huyer, Willem de Muynck,
Hermann Schichl, Tapio Schneider, Victor Stenger, Karl Svozil, Roderich
Tumulka and Edmund Weinmann for useful discussions of earlier versions of
this manuscript.
2 Quantities
But you [God] have arranged all things by measure and number
and weight.
Wisdom of Solomon 11:20, ca. 150 B.C. [85]
A quantity in the general sense is a property ascribed to phe-
nomena, bodies, or substances that can be quantified for, or
assigned to, a particular phenomenon, body, or substance. [...]
The value of a physical quantity is the quantitative expression
of a particular physical quantity as the product of a number
and a unit, the number being its numerical value.
International System of Units (SI), 1995 [77]
All our scientific knowledge is based on past observation, and only gives
rise to conjectures about the future. Mathematical consistency requires that
our choices are constrained by some formal laws. When we want to predict
something, the true answer depends on knowledge we do not have. We can
calculate at best approximations whose accuracy can be estimated using
statistical techniques (assuming that the quality of our models is good).
This implies that we must distinguish between quantities (formal concepts
that determine what can possibly be measured or calculated) and numbers
(the results of measurements and calculations themselves); those quantities
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that are constant by the nature of the concept considered behave just like
numbers.
This terminology is close to the definitions used in the document defining the
international system of units, from which we quoted above. We deliberately
avoid the notion of observables, since it is not clear a priori what it means
to ‘observe’ something, and since many things (such as the fine structure
constant, neutrino masses, decay rates, scattering cross sections) which can
be observed in nature are only indirectly related to what is traditionally
called an ‘observable’.
Physicists are used to calculating with quantities that they may add and
multiply without restrictions; if the quantities are complex, the complex
conjugate can also be formed. It must also be possible to compare quantities,
at least in certain cases.
Therefore we take as primitive objects of our treatment a set E of quantities,
such that the sum and the product of quantities is again a quantity, and there
is an operation generalizing complex conjugation. Moreover, we assume that
there is an ordering relation that allows us to compare two quantities.
Operations on quantities and their comparison are required to satisfy a few
simple rules; they are called axioms since we take them as a formal starting
point without making any further demands on the nature of the symbols
we are using. Our axioms are motivated by the wish to be as general as
possible while still preserving the ability to manipulate quantities in the
manner familiar from matrix algebra. (Similar axioms for quantities have
been proposed, e.g., by Dirac [17].)
2.1 Definition.
(i) E denotes a set whose elements are called quantities. For any two quan-
tities f, g ∈ E, the sum f + g, the product fg, and the conjugate f ∗ are
also quantities. It is also specified for which pairs of quantities the relation
f ≥ g holds.
The following axioms (Q1)–(Q8) are assumed to hold for all complex numbers
α ∈ C and all quantities f, g, h ∈ E.
(Q1) C ⊆ E, i.e., complex numbers are special quantities, where addition,
multiplication and conjugation have their traditional meaning.
(Q2) (fg)h = f(gh), αf = fα, 0f = 0, 1f = f .
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(Q3) (f + g) + h = f + (g + h), f(g + h) = fg + fh, f + 0 = f .
(Q4) f ∗∗ = f , (fg)∗ = g∗f ∗, (f + g)∗ = f ∗ + g∗.
(Q5) f ∗f = 0 ⇒ f = 0.
(Q6) ≥ is a partial order, i.e., it is reflexive (f ≥ f), antisymmetric (f ≥
g ≥ f ⇒ f = g) and transitive (f ≥ g ≥ h⇒ f ≥ h).
(Q7) f ≥ g ⇒ f + h ≥ g + h.
(Q8) f ≥ 0 ⇒ f = f ∗ and g∗fg ≥ 0.
(Q9) 1 ≥ 0.
If (Q1)–(Q9) are satisfied we say that E is a Q-algebra.
(ii) We introduce the traditional notation
f ≤ g :⇔ g ≥ f,
−f := (−1)f, f − g := f + (−g), [f, g] := fg − gf,
f 0 := 1, f l := f l−1f (l = 1, 2, . . .),
Re f =
1
2
(f + f ∗), Im f =
1
2i
(f − f ∗),
‖f‖ = inf{α ∈ R | f ∗f ≤ α2, α ≥ 0}.
(The infimum of the empty set is taken to be ∞.) [f, g] is called the com-
mutator of f and g, Re f , Im f and ‖f‖ are referred to as the real part,
the imaginary part, and the (spectral) norm of f , respectively. The
uniform topology is the topology induced on E by declaring a set E open
if it contains a ball {f ∈ E | ‖f‖ < ε} for some ε > 0.
(iii) A quantity f ∈ E is called bounded if ‖f‖ <∞, Hermitian if f ∗ = f ,
and normal if [f, f ∗] = 0. More generally, a set F of quantities is called
normal if all its quantities commute with each other and with their conju-
gates.
Note that every Hermitian quantity (and in a commutative algebra, every
quantity) is normal.
2.2 Examples.
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(i) The commutative algebra E = Cn with pointwise multiplication and com-
ponentwise inequalities is a Q-algebra, if vectors with constant entries α are
identified with α ∈ C. This Q-algebra describes properties of n classical
elementary events; cf. Example 4.2(i).
(ii) E = Cn×n is a Q-algebra if complex numbers are identified with the scalar
multiples of the identity matrix, and f ≥ g iff f−g is Hermitian and positive
semidefinite. This Q-algebra describes quantum systems with n levels. For
n = 2, it also describes a single spin, or a qubit.
(iii) The algebra of all complex-valued functions on a set Ω, with pointwise
multiplication and pointwise inequalities is a Q-algebra. Suitable subalgebras
of such algebras describe classical probability theory – cf. Example 6.3(i) –
and classical mechanics – cf. Example 8.2(i). In the latter case, Ω is the
phase space of the system considered.
(iv) The algebra of bounded linear operators on a Hilbert space H, with
f ≥ g iff f − g is Hermitian and positive semidefinite, is a Q-algebra. They
(or the more general C∗-algebras and von Neumann algebras) are frequently
taken as the basis of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics.
(v) The algebra of continuous linear operators on the Schwartz space S(Ωqu)
of rapidly decaying functions on a manifold Ωqu is a Q-algebra. It also allows
the discussion of unbounded quantities. In quantum physics, Ωqu is the
configuration space of the system.
Note that physicist generally need to work with unbounded quantities, while
much of the discussion on foundations takes the more restricted Hilbert space
point of view. The theory presented here is formulated in a way to take care
of unbounded quantities, while in our examples, we select the point of view
as deemed profitable.
We shall see that, for the general, qualitative aspects of the theory there is no
need to know any details of how to actually perform calculations with quanti-
ties; this is only needed if one wants to calculate specific properties for specific
systems. In this respect, the situation is quite similar to the traditional ax-
iomatic treatment of real numbers: The axioms specify the permitted ways
to handle formulas involving these numbers; and this is enough to derive
calculus, say, without the need to specify either what real numbers are or al-
gorithmic rules for addition, multiplication and division. Of course, the latter
are needed when one wants to do specific calculations but not while one tries
to get insight into a problem. And as the development of pocket calculators
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has shown, the capacity for understanding theory and that for knowing the
best ways of calculation need not even reside in the same person.
Note that we assume commutativity only between numbers and quantities.
However, general commutativity of the addition is a consequence of our other
assumptions. We prove this together with some other useful relations.
2.3 Proposition. For all quantities f , g, h ∈ E and λ ∈ C,
(f + g)h = fh+ gh, f − f = 0, f + g = g + f (1)
[f, f ∗] = −2i[Re f, Im f ], (2)
f ∗f ≥ 0, ff ∗ ≥ 0. (3)
f ∗f ≤ 0 ⇒ ‖f‖ = 0 ⇒ f = 0, (4)
f ≤ g ⇒ h∗fh ≤ h∗gh, |λ|f ≤ |λ|g, (5)
f ∗g + g∗f ≤ 2‖f‖ ‖g‖, (6)
‖λf‖ = |λ|‖f‖, ‖f ± g‖ ≤ ‖f‖ ± ‖g‖, (7)
‖fg‖ ≤ ‖f‖ ‖g‖. (8)
Proof. The right distributive law follows from
(f + g)h = ((f + g)h)∗∗ = (h∗(f + g)∗)∗ = (h∗(f ∗ + g∗))∗
= (h∗f ∗ + h∗g∗)∗ = (h∗f ∗)∗ + (h∗g∗)∗
= f ∗∗h∗∗ + g∗∗h∗∗ = fh+ gh.
It implies f − f = 1f − 1f = (1− 1)f = 0f = 0. From this, we may deduce
that addition is commutative, as follows. The quantity h := −f + g satisfies
−h = (−1)((−1)f + g) = (−1)(−1)f + (−1)g = f − g,
and we have
f+g = f+(h−h)+g = (f+h)+(−h+g) = (f−f+g)+(f−g+g) = g+f.
This proves (1). If u = Re f , v = Im f then u∗ = u, v∗ = v and f =
u+ iv, f ∗ = u− iv. Hence
[f, f ∗] = (u+ iv)(u− iv)− (u− iv)(u+ iv) = 2i(vu− uv) = −2i[Re f, Im f ],
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giving (2). (3)–(5) follow directly from (Q7) – (Q9). Now let α = ‖f‖,
β = ‖g‖. Then f ∗f ≤ α2 and g∗g ≤ β2. Since
0 ≤ (βf − αg)∗(βf − αg) = β2f ∗f − αβ(f ∗g + g∗f) + α2g∗g
≤ β2α2 ± αβ(f ∗g + g∗f) + α2g∗g,
f ∗g + g∗f ≤ 2αβ if αβ 6= 0, and for αβ = 0, the same follows from (4).
Therefore (6) holds. The first half of (7) is trivial, and the second half
follows for the plus sign from
(f + g)∗(f + g) = f ∗f + f ∗g + g∗f + g∗g ≤ α2 + 2αβ + β2 = (α + β)2,
and then for the minus sign from the first half. Finally, by (5),
(fg)∗(fg) = g∗f ∗fg ≤ g∗α2g = α2g∗g ≤ α2β2.
This implies (8). ⊓⊔
2.4 Corollary.
(i) Among the complex numbers, precisely the nonnegative real numbers λ
satisfy λ ≥ 0.
(ii) For all f ∈ E, Re f and Im f are Hermitian. f is Hermitian iff f = Re f iff
Im f = 0. If f, g are commuting Hermitian quantities then fg is Hermitian,
too.
(iii) f is normal iff [Re f, Im f ] = 0.
Proof. (i) If λ is a nonnegative real number then λ = f ∗f ≥ 0 with f = √λ.
If λ is a negative real number then λ = −f ∗f ≤ 0 with f = √−λ, and by
antisymmetry, λ ≥ 0 is impossible. If λ is a nonreal number then λ 6= λ∗ and
λ ≥ 0 is impossible by (Q8).
The first two assertions of (ii) are trivial, and the third holds since (fg)∗ =
g∗f ∗ = gf = fg if f, g are Hermitian and commute.
(iii) follows from (2). ⊓⊔
Thus, in conventional terminology (see, e.g., Rickart [69]), E is a partially
ordered nondegenerate *-algebra with unity, but not necessarily with
a commutative multiplication.
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2.5 Remark. In the realizations of the axioms I know of, e.g., in C∗-algebras
(Rickart [69]), we also have the relations
‖f ∗‖ = ‖f‖, ‖f ∗f‖ = ‖f‖2,
and
0 ≤ f ≤ g ⇒ f 2 ≤ g2,
but I have not been able to prove these from the present axioms, and they
were not needed to develop the theory.
As the example E = Cn×n shows, E may have zero divisors, and not every
nonzero quantity need have an inverse. Therefore, in the manipulation of
formulas, precisely the same precautions must be taken as in ordinary matrix
algebra.
3 Complementarity
You cannot have the penny and the cake.
Proverb
The lack of commutativity gives rise to the phenomenon of complementarity,
expressed by inequalities that demonstrate the danger of simply thinking of
quantities in terms of numbers.
3.1 Definition. Two Hermitian quantities f, g are called complementary
if there is a real number γ > 0 such that
(f − x)2 + (g − y)2 ≥ γ2 for all x, y ∈ R. (9)
Complementarity captures the phenomenon where two quantities do not have
simultaneous sharp classical ‘values’.
3.2 Theorem.
(i) In Cn×n, two complementary quantities cannot commute.
(ii) A (commutative) Q-algebra of complex-valued functions on a set Ω con-
tains no complementary pair of quantities.
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Proof. (i) Any two commuting quantities f, g have a common eigenvector ψ.
If fψ = xψ and gψ = yψ then ψ∗((f − x)2 + (g − y)2)ψ = 0, whereas (9)
implies
ψ∗(f − x)2 + (g − y)2)ψ ≥ γ2ψ∗ψ > 0.
Thus f, g cannot be complementary.
(ii) Setting x = f(ω), y = g(ω) in (9), we find 0 ≥ γ2, contradicting γ > 0.
⊓⊔
I have not been able to decide whether a commutative Q-algebra containing
complementary quantities exist, or whether complementary quantities in an
infinite-dimensional Q-algebra can possibly commute. (It is impossible when
there is a joint spectral resolution.)
3.3 Examples.
(i) C2×2 contains a complementary pair of quantities. For example, the Pauli
matrices
σ1 =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σ3 =
(
1 0
0 − 1
)
(10)
are complementary; see Proposition 3.4(i) below.
(ii) The algebra of bounded linear operators on a Hilbert space of dimen-
sion greater than one contains a complementary pair of quantities, since it
contains a subalgebra isomorphic to C2×2.
(iii) In the algebra of all linear operators on the Schwartz space S(R), posi-
tion q, defined by
(qf)(x) = xf(x),
and momentum p, defined by
(pf)(x) = −ih¯f ′(x),
where h¯ > 0 is Planck’s constant, are complementary. Since q and p are
Hermitian, this follows from the easily verified canonical commutation
relation
[q, p] = ih¯ (11)
and Proposition 3.4(ii) below.
The name ’complementarity’ comes from the fact that if one finds in an ex-
periment (reasonably) sharp values for position, one gets the ’particle view’
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of quantum mechanics, while if one finds (reasonably) sharp values for mo-
mentum, one gets the ’wave view’. The views are complementary in the
sense that while, correctly interpreted (namely as the position and momen-
tum representation, respectively), both descriptions are formally equivalent,
nevertheless arbitrarily sharp values for both position and momentum cannot
be realized simultaneously in experiments. See Section 5, in particular the
discussion after Proposition 5.1, for lower bounds on the uncertainty, and
Section 8 for the concept of (idealized) sharpness.
3.4 Proposition.
(i) The Pauli matrices (10) satisfy
(σ1 − s1)2 + (σ3 − s3)2 ≥ 1 for all s1, s3 ∈ R. (12)
(ii) Let p, q be Hermitian quantities satisfying [q, p] = ih¯. Then, for any
k, x ∈ R and any positive ∆p,∆q ∈ R,
(p− k
∆p
)2
+
(q − x
∆q
)2
≥ h¯
∆p∆q
. (13)
Proof. (i) A simple calculation gives
(σ1 − s1)2 + (σ3 − s3)2 − 1 =
(
s21 + (1− s3)2 −2s1
−2s1 s21 + (1 + s3)2
)
≥ 0,
since the diagonal is nonnegative and the determinant is (s21 + s
2
3 − 1)2 ≥ 0.
(ii) The quantities f = (q − x)/∆q and g = (p − k)/∆p are Hermitian and
satisfy [f, g] = [q, p]/∆q∆p = iκ where κ = h¯/∆q∆p. Now (13) follows from
0 ≤ (f + ig)∗(f + ig) = f 2 + g2 + i[f, g] = f 2 + g2 − κ.
⊓⊔
The complementarity of position and momentum expressed by (13) is the
deeper reason for the Heisenberg uncertainty relation discussed later in (22)
and (23).
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4 Ensembles
We may assume that words are akin to the matter which
they describe; when they relate to the lasting and perma-
nent and intelligible, they ought to be lasting and unalter-
able, and, as far as their nature allows, irrefutable and
immovable – nothing less. But when they express only
the copy or likeness and not the eternal things themselves,
they need only be likely and analogous to the real words.
As being is to becoming, so is truth to belief.
Plato, ca. 367 B.C. [68]
The stochastic nature of quantum mechanics is usually discussed in terms
of probabilities. However, from a strictly logical point of view, this has the
drawback that one gets into conflict with the traditional foundation of prob-
ability theory by Kolmogorov [46], which does not extend to the noncom-
mutative case. Mathematical physicists (see, e.g., Parthasarathy [61],
Meyer [54]) developed a far reaching quantum probability calculus based
on Hilbert space theory. But their approach is highly formal, drawing its
motivation from analogies to the classical case rather than from the common
operational meaning.
Whittle [83] presents a much less known but very elegant alternative ap-
proach to classical probability theory, equivalent to that of Kolmogorov, that
treats expectation as the basic concept and derives probability from axioms
for the expectation. (See the discussion in [83, Section 3.4] why, for historical
reasons, this has so far remained a minority approach.)
The approach via expectations is easy to motivate, leads quickly to interesting
results, and extends without trouble to the quantum world, yielding the
ensembles (‘mixed states’) of traditional quantum physics. As we shall see,
explicit probabilities enter only at a very late stage of the development.
A significant advantage of the expectation approach compared with the prob-
ability approach is that it is intuitively more removed from a connotation of
‘unlimited repeatability’. Hence it can be naturally used for unique systems
such as the set of all natural globular proteins (cf., e.g., Neumaier [55]), the
climate of the earth, or the universe, and to deterministic, pseudo-random
behavior such as rounding errors in floating point computations (cf., e.g.,
Higham [33, Section 2.6]), once these have enough complexity to exhibit
finite internal repetitivity to which the weak law of large numbers (Theorem
4.4 below) may be applied.
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The axioms we shall require for meaningful expectations are those trivially
satisfied for weighted averages of a finite ensemble of observations. While
this motivates the form of the axioms and the name ‘ensemble’ attached to
the concept, there is no need at all to interpret expectation as an average
(or, indeed, the ’ensemble’ as a multitude of actual or possible ’realizations’);
this is appropriate only in certain classical situations.
In general, ensembles are simply a way to consistently organize structured
data obtained by some process of observation. For the purpose of statistical
analysis and prediction, it is completely irrelevant what this process of ob-
servation entails. What matters is only that for certain quantities observed
values are available that can be compared with their expectations. The ex-
pectation of a quantity f is simply a value near which, based on the theory,
we should expect an observed value for f . At the same time, the standard
deviation serves as a measure of the amount to which we should expect this
nearness to deviate from exactness. (For more on observed values, see Sec-
tions 8–10.)
4.1 Definition.
(i) An ensemble is a mapping − that assigns to each quantity f ∈ E its
expectation f =: 〈f〉 ∈ C such that for all f, g ∈ E, α ∈ C,
(E1) 〈1〉 = 1, 〈f ∗〉 = 〈f〉∗, 〈f + g〉 = 〈f〉+ 〈g〉,
(E2) 〈αf〉 = α〈f〉,
(E3) If f ≥ 0 then 〈f〉 ≥ 0,
(E4) If fl ∈ E, fl ↓ 0 then inf〈fl〉 = 0.
Here fl ↓ 0 means that the fl converge almost everywhere to 0, and fl+1 ≤ fl
for all l.
(ii) The number
cov(f, g) := Re〈(f − f)∗(g − g)〉
is called the covariance of f, g ∈ E. Two quantities f, g are called corre-
lated if cov(f, g) 6= 0, and uncorrelated otherwise.
(iii) The number
σ(f) :=
√
cov(f, f)
is called the uncertainty or standard deviation of f ∈ E in the ensemble
〈·〉.
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This definition generalizes the expectation axioms of Whittle [83, Section
2.2] for classical probability theory and the definitions of elementary classical
statistics. Note that (E3) ensures that σ(f) is a nonnegative real number that
vanishes if f is a constant quantity (i.e., a complex number).
(We shall not use axiom (E4) in this paper and therefore do not go into
technicalities about almost everywhere convergence, which are needed to get
equivalence to Kolmogorov’s probability theory in the classical case.)
4.2 Examples.
(i) Finite probability theory. In the commutative Q-algebra E = Cn with
componentwise multiplication and componentwise inequalities, every linear
functional on E, and in particular every ensemble, has the form
〈f〉 =
n∑
k=1
pkfk (14)
for certain weights pk. The ensemble axioms hold precisely when the pk are
nonnegative and add up to one; thus 〈f〉 is a weighted average, and the
weights have the intuitive meaning of ‘probabilities’.
Note that the weights can be recovered from the expectation by means of the
formula pk = 〈ek〉, where ek is the unit vector with a one in component k.
(ii) Quantum mechanical ensembles. In the Q-algebra E of bounded
linear operators on a Hilbert space H, quantum mechanics describes a pure
ensemble (traditionally called a ‘pure state’) by the expectation
〈f〉 := ψ∗fψ,
where ψ ∈ H is a unit vector. And quantum thermodynamics describes an
equilibrium ensemble by the expectation
〈f〉 := tr e−S/k¯f,
where k¯ > 0 is the Boltzmann constant, and S is a Hermitian quantity
with tr e−S/k¯ = 1 called the entropy whose spectrum is discrete and bounded
below. In both cases, the ensemble axioms are easily verified.
4.3 Proposition. For any ensemble,
(i) f ≤ g ⇒ 〈f〉 ≤ 〈g〉.
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(ii) For f, g ∈ E,
cov(f, g) = Re(〈f ∗g〉 − 〈f〉∗〈g〉),
〈f ∗f〉 = 〈f〉∗〈f〉+ σ(f)2,
|〈f〉| ≤
√
〈f ∗f〉.
(iii) If f is Hermitian then f¯ = 〈f〉 is real and
σ(f) =
√
〈(f − f)2〉 =
√
〈f 2〉 − 〈f〉2.
(iv) Two commuting Hermitian quantities f, g are uncorrelated iff
〈fg〉 = 〈f〉〈g〉.
Proof. (i) follows from (E1) and (E3).
(ii) The first formula holds since
〈(f − f¯)∗(g − g¯)〉 = 〈f ∗g〉 − f¯ ∗〈g〉 − 〈f〉∗g¯ + f¯ ∗g¯ = 〈f ∗g〉 − 〈f〉∗〈g〉.
The second formula follows for g = f , using (E1), and the third formula is
an immediate consequence.
(iii) follows from (E1) and (ii).
(iv) If f, g are Hermitian and commute the fg is Hermitian by Corollary
2.4(ii), hence 〈fg〉 is real. By (ii), cov(f, g) = 〈fg〉−〈f〉〈g〉, and the assertion
follows.
⊓⊔
Fundamental for the practical use of ensembles, and basic to statistical me-
chanics, is the weak law of large numbers:
4.4 Theorem. For a family of quantities fl (l = 1, . . . , N) with constant
expectation 〈fl〉 = µ, the mean value
f¯ :=
1
N
N∑
l=1
fl
satisfies
〈f¯〉 = µ.
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If, in addition, the fl are uncorrelated and have constant standard deviation
σ(fl) = σ then
σ(f¯) = σ/
√
N (15)
becomes arbitrarily small as N becomes sufficiently large.
Proof. We have
〈f¯〉 = 1
N
(〈f1〉+ . . .+ 〈fN〉) = 1
N
(µ+ . . .+ µ) = µ
and
f¯ ∗f¯ =
1
N2
(∑
j
fj
)
∗
(∑
k
fk
)
= N−2
∑
j,k
f ∗j fk.
Now
〈f ∗j fj〉 = 〈fj〉∗〈fj〉+ σ(fj)2 = |µ|2 + σ2
and, if the fl are uncorrelated, for j 6= k,
〈f ∗j fk + f ∗kfj〉 = 2Re〈f ∗j fk〉 = 2Re〈fj〉∗〈fk〉 = 2Reµ∗µ = 2|µ|2.
Hence
σ(f¯)2 = 〈f¯ ∗f¯〉 − 〈f¯〉∗〈f¯〉
= N−2
(
N(σ2 + |µ|2) + (N
2
)
2|µ|2
)
− µ∗µ = N−1σ2,
and the assertions follow. ⊓⊔
As a significant body of work in probability theory shows, the conditions
under which σ(f¯)→ 0 as N →∞ can be significantly relaxed.
5 Uncertainty
For you do not know which will succeed, whether this or
that, or whether both will do equally well.
Kohelet, ca. 250 B.C. [45]
But if we have food and clothing, we will be content with
that.
St. Paul, ca. 60 A.D. [63]
Due to our inability to prepare experiments with a sufficient degree of sharp-
ness to know with certainty everything about a system we investigate, we
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need to describe the preparation of experiments in a stochastic language
that permits the discussion of such uncertainties; in other words, we shall
model prepared experiments by ensembles.
Formally, the essential difference between classical mechanics and quantum
mechanics in the latter’s lack of commutativity. While in classical mechan-
ics there is in principle no lower limit to the uncertainties with which we
can prepare the quantities in a system of interest, the quantum mechanical
uncertainty relation for noncommuting quantities puts strict limits on the
uncertainties in the preparation of microscopic ensembles. Here, preparation
is defined informally as bringing the system into an ensemble such that mea-
suring certain quantities gives values that agree with the expectation to an
accuracy specified by given uncertainties.
In this section, we discuss the limits of the accuracy to which this can be
done.
5.1 Proposition.
(i) The Cauchy–Schwarz inequality
|〈f ∗g〉|2 ≤ 〈f ∗f〉〈g∗g〉
holds for all f, g ∈ E.
(ii) The uncertainty relation
σ(f)2σ(g)2 ≥ | cov(f, g)|2 + ∣∣ 1
2
〈f ∗g − g∗f〉∣∣2
holds for all f, g ∈ E.
(iii) For f, g ∈ E,
cov(f, g) = cov(g, f) = 1
2
(σ(f + g)2 − σ(f)2 − σ(g)2), (16)
| cov(f, g)| ≤ σ(f)σ(g), (17)
σ(f + g) ≤ σ(f) + σ(g). (18)
In particular,
|〈fg〉 − 〈f〉〈g〉| ≤ σ(f)σ(g) for commuting Hermitian f, g. (19)
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Proof. (i) For arbitrary α, β ∈ C we have
0 ≤ 〈(αf − βg)∗(αf − βg)〉
= α∗α〈f ∗f〉 − α∗β〈f ∗g〉 − β∗α〈g∗f〉+ ββ∗〈g∗g〉
= |α|2〈f ∗f〉 − 2Re(α∗β〈f ∗g〉) + |β|2〈g∗g〉
We now choose β = 〈f ∗g〉, and obtain for arbitrary real α the inequality
0 ≤ α2〈f ∗f〉 − 2α|〈f ∗g〉|2 + |〈f ∗g〉|2〈g∗g〉. (20)
The further choice α = 〈g∗g〉 gives
0 ≤ 〈g∗g〉2〈f ∗f〉 − 〈g∗g〉|〈f ∗g〉|2.
If 〈g∗g〉 > 0, we find after division by 〈g∗g〉 that (i) holds. And if 〈g∗g〉 ≤ 0
then 〈g∗g〉 = 0 and we have 〈f ∗g〉 = 0 since otherwise a tiny α produces a
negative right hand side in (20). Thus (i) also holds in this case.
(ii) Since (f − f¯)∗(g − g¯) − (g − g¯)∗(f − f¯) = f ∗g − g∗f , it is sufficient to
prove the uncertainty relation for the case of quantities f, g whose expectation
vanishes. In this case, (i) implies
(Re〈f ∗g〉)2 + (Im〈f ∗g〉)2 = |〈f ∗g〉|2 ≤ 〈f ∗f〉〈g∗g〉 = σ(f)2σ(g)2.
The assertion follows since Re〈f ∗g〉 = cov(f, g) and
i Im〈f ∗g〉 = 1
2
(〈f ∗g〉 − 〈f ∗g〉∗) = 1
2
〈f ∗g − g∗f〉.
(iii) Again, it is sufficient to consider the case of quantities f, g whose expec-
tation vanishes. Then
σ(f + g)2 = 〈(f + g)∗(f + g)〉 = 〈f ∗f〉+ 〈f ∗g + g∗f〉+ 〈g∗g〉
= σ(f)2 + 2 cov(f, g) + σ(g)2,
(21)
and (16) follows. (17) is an immediate consequence of (ii), and (18) fol-
lows easily from (21) and (17). Finally, (19) is a consequence of (17) and
Proposition 4.3(iii). ⊓⊔
In the classical case of commuting Hermitian quantities, the uncertainty rela-
tion just reduces to the well-known inequality (17) of classical statistics. For
noncommuting Hermitian quantities, the uncertainty relation is stronger. In
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particular, we may deduce from the commutation relation (11) for position
q and momentum p Heisenberg’s [32, 70] uncertainty relation
σ(q)σ(p) ≥ 1
2
h¯. (22)
Thus no ensemble exists where both p and q have arbitrarily small standard
deviation. (More general noncommuting Hermitian quantities f, g may have
some ensembles with σ(f) = σ(g) = 0, namely among those with 〈fg〉 =
〈gf〉.)
Putting k = p¯ and x = q¯, taking expectations in (13) and using Proposition
4.3(iii), we find another version of the uncertainty relation, implying again
that σ(p) and σ(q) cannot be made simultaneously very small:
(σ(p)
∆p
)2
+
(σ(q)
∆q
)2
≥ h¯
∆p∆q
. (23)
Heisenberg’s relation (22) follows from it by putting ∆p = σ(p) and ∆q =
σ(q).
The same argument shows that no ensemble exists where two complemen-
tary quantities both have arbitrarily small standard deviation. (More gen-
eral noncommuting Hermitian quantities f, g may have some ensembles with
σ(f) = σ(g) = 0, namely among those with 〈fg〉 = 〈gf〉.)
We now derive a characterization of the quantities f with vanishing uncer-
tainty, σ(f) = 0; in classical probability theory these correspond to quantities
(random variables) that have fixed values in every realization.
5.2 Definition. We say a quantity f vanishes in the ensemble 〈·〉 if
〈f ∗f〉 = 0.
5.3 Theorem.
(i) σ(f) = 0 iff f − 〈f〉 vanishes.
(ii) If f vanishes in the ensemble 〈·〉 then 〈f〉 = 0.
(iii) The set V of vanishing quantities satisfies
f + g ∈ V if f, g ∈ V,
fg ∈ V if g ∈ V and f ∈ E is bounded,
f 2 ∈ V if f ∈ V is Hermitian.
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Proof. (i) holds since g = f − 〈f〉 satisfies 〈g∗g〉 = σ(f)2.
(ii) follows from Proposition 4.3(ii).
(iii) If f, g ∈ V then 〈f ∗g〉 = 0 and 〈g∗f〉 = 0 by the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality, hence 〈(f + g)∗(f + g)〉 = 〈f ∗f〉+ 〈g∗g〉 = 0, so that f + h ∈ V .
If g ∈ V and f is bounded then
(fg)∗(fg) = g∗f ∗fg ≤ g∗‖f‖2g = ‖f‖2g∗g
implies 〈(fg)∗(fg)〉 ≤ ‖f‖2〈g∗g〉 = 0, so that fg ∈ V .
And if f ∈ V is Hermitian then 〈f 2〉 = 〈f ∗f〉 = 0, and, again by Cauchy-
Schwarz, 〈f 4〉 ≤ 〈f 6〉〈f 2〉 = 0, so that f 2 ∈ V . ⊓⊔
6 Probability
Enough, if we adduce probabilities as likely as any others;
for we must remember that I who am the speaker, and you
who are the judges, are only mortal men, and we ought to
accept the tale which is probable and enquire no further.
Plato, ca. 367 B.C. [68]
The interpretation of probability has been surrounded by philosophical puzz-
les for a long time. Fine [24] is probably still the best discussion of the
problems involved; Hacking [29] gives a good account of its early history.
(See also Home & Whitaker [36].) Sklar [73] has an in depth discussion
of the specific problems relating to statistical mechanics.
Our definition generalizes the classical intuition of probabilities as weights
in a weighted average and is modeled after the formula for finite probability
theory in Example 4.2(i). In the special case when a well-defined counting
process may be associated with the statement whose probability is assessed,
our exposition supports the conclusion ofDrieschner [18, p.73], “probability
is predicted relative frequency” (German original: “Wahrscheinlichkeit ist
vorausgesagte relative Ha¨ufigkeit”). More specifically, we assert that, for
counting events, the probability carries the information of expected relative
frequency (see Theorem 6.4(iii) below).
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To make this precise we need a precise concept of independent events that
may be counted. To motivate our definition, assume that we look at times
t1, . . . , tN for the presence of an event of the sort we want to count. We
introduce quantities el whose value is the amount added to the counter at
time tl. For correct counting, we need el ≈ 1 if an event happened at time
tl, and el ≈ 0 otherwise; thus el should have the two possible values 0 and 1
only. Since these numbers are precisely the Hermitian idempotents among the
constant quantities, this suggests to identify events with general Hermitian
idempotent quantities.
In addition, it will be useful to have the more general concept of ‘effects’ (cf.
Busch et al. [10, 11], Davies [16], Peres [66]) for more fuzzy, event-like
things.
6.1 Definition.
(i) A quantity e ∈ E satisfying 0 ≤ e ≤ 1 is called an effect. The number
〈e〉 is called the probability of the effect e. Two effects e, e′ are called
independent in an ensemble 〈·〉 if they commute and satisfy
〈ee′〉 = 〈e〉〈e′〉.
(ii) A quantity e ∈ E satisfying e2 = e = e∗ is called an event. Two events
e, e′ are called disjoint if ee′ = e′e = 0.
(iii) An alternative is a family el (l ∈ L) of effects such that∑
l∈L
el ≤ 1.
6.2 Proposition.
(i) Every event is an effect.
(ii) The probability of an effect e satisfies 0 ≤ 〈e〉 ≤ 1.
(iii) The set of all effects is convex and closed in the uniform topology.
(iv) Any two events in an alternative are disjoint.
Proof. (i) holds since 0 ≤ e∗e = e2 = e and 0 ≤ (1−e)∗(1−e) = 1−2e+e2 =
1− e.
(ii) and (iii) follow easily from Proposition 4.3.
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(iv) If ek, el are events in an alternative then ek ≤ 1− el and
(ekel)
∗(ekel) = e
∗
l e
∗
kekel = e
∗
l e
2
kel = e
∗
l ekel ≤ e∗l (1− el)el = 0.
Hence ekel = 0 and elek = e
∗
l e
∗
k = (ekel)
∗ = 0. ⊓⊔
Note that we have a well-defined notion of probability though the concept
of a probability distribution is absent. It is neither needed nor definable in
general. Nevertheless, the theory contains classical probability theory as a
special case.
6.3 Examples.
(i) Classical probability theory. In classical probability theory, quantities
are usually called random variables; they belong to the Q-algebra B(Ω) of
measurable complex-valued functions on a measurable set Ω.
The characteristic function e = χM of any measurable subset M of Ω (with
χM(ω) = 1 if ω ∈ M , χM(ω) = 0 otherwise) is an event. A family of
characteristic functions χMl form an alternative iff their supports Ml are
pairwise disjoint (apart from a set of measure zero).
Effects are the measurable functions e with values in [0, 1]; they can be
considered as ‘characteristic functions’ of a fuzzy set where ω ∈ Ω has e(ω)
as degree of membership (see, e.g., Zimmermann [87]).
For many applications, the algebra B(Ω) is too big, and suitable subalgebras
E are selected on which the relevant ensembles can be defined as integrals
with respect to suitable positive measures.
(ii) Quantum probability theory. In the algebra of bounded linear oper-
ators on a Hilbert space H, every unit vector ϕ ∈ H gives rise to an event
eϕ = ϕϕ
∗. We shall call such events irreducible events. A family of irre-
ducible events eϕl form an alternative iff the ϕl are pairwise orthogonal. The
probability of an irreducible event eϕ in an ensemble corresponding to the
unit vector ψ is
〈eϕ〉 = ψ∗eϕψ = ψ∗ϕϕ∗ψ = |ϕ∗ψ|2. (24)
This is the well-known squared probability amplitude formula, tradition-
ally interpreted as the probability that after preparing a pure ensemble in
the pure ‘state’ ψ, an ‘ideal measurement’ causes a ‘state reduction’ to the
new pure ‘state’ ϕ.
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In contrast, our interpretation of |ϕ∗ψ|2 is completely within the formal
framework of the theory and completely independent of the measurement
process.
Further, reducible, quantum events are orthogonal projectors to subspaces.
The effects are the Hermitian operators e with spectrum in [0, 1].
6.4 Theorem.
(i) For any effect e, its negation ¬e = 1− e is an effect with probability
〈¬e〉 = 1− 〈e〉;
it is an event if e is an event.
(ii) For commuting effects e, e′, the quantities
e ∧ e′ = ee′ (e and e′),
e ∨ e′ = e+ e′ − ee′ (e or e′)
are effects whose probabilities satisfy
〈e ∧ e′〉+ 〈e ∨ e′〉 = 〈e〉+ 〈e′〉;
they are events if e, e′ are events. Moreover,
〈e ∧ e′〉 = 〈e〉〈e′〉 for independent effects e, e′.
(iii) For a family of effects el (l = 1, . . . , N) with constant probability 〈el〉 = p,
the relative frequency
q :=
1
N
N∑
l=1
el
satisfies
〈q〉 = p.
(iv) For a family of independent events of probability p, the uncertainty
σ(q) =
√
p(1− p)
N
of the relative frequency becomes arbitrarily small as N becomes sufficiently
large (weak law of large numbers).
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Proof. (i) ¬e is an effect since 0 ≤ 1 − e ≤ 1, and its probability is 〈¬e〉 =
〈1− e〉 = 1− 〈e〉. If e is an event then clearly ¬e is Hermitian, and (¬e)2 =
(1− e)2 = 1− 2e+ e2 = 1− e = ¬e. Hence ¬e is an event.
(ii) Since e and e′ commute, e ∧ e′ = ee′ = e2e′ = ee′e. Since ee′e ≥ 0 and
ee′e ≤ ee = e ≤ 1, we see that e∧e′ is an effect. Therefore, e∨e′ = e+e′−ee′ =
1 − (1 − e)(1 − e′) = ¬(¬e ∧ ¬e′) is also an effect. The assertions about
expectations are immediate. If e, e′ are events then (ee′)∗ = e′∗e∗ = e′e = ee′,
hence ee′ is Hermitian; and it is idempotent since (ee′)2 = ee′ee′ = e2e′2 = ee′.
Therefore e ∧ e′ = ee′ is an event, and e ∨ e′ = ¬(¬e ∧ ¬e′) is an event, too.
(iii) This is immediate by taking the expectation of q.
(iv) This follows from Theorem 4.4 since 〈e2k〉 = 〈ek〉 = p and
σ(ek)
2 = 〈(ek − p)2〉 = 〈e2k〉 − 2p〈ek〉+ p2 = p− 2p2 + p2 = p(1− p).
⊓⊔
We remark in passing that, with the operations ∧,∨,¬, the set of events
in any commutative subalgebra of E forms a Boolean algebra; see Stone
[75]. Traditional quantum logic (see, e.g., Birkhoff & von Neumann
[6], Pitowsky [67], Svozil [76]) discusses the extent to which this can be
generalized to the noncommutative case. We shall make no use of quantum
logic; the only logic used is classical logic, applied to well-defined assertions
about quantities. However, certain facets of quantum logic related to so-
called ‘hidden variables’ are discussed from a different point of view in the
next section.
The set of effects in a commutative subalgebra is not a Boolean algebra.
Indeed, e ∧ e 6= e for effects e that are not events. In fuzzy set terms, if e
codes the answer to the question ‘(to which degree) is statement S true?’
then e∧ e codes the answer to the question ‘(to which degree) is statement S
really true?’, indicating the application of more stringent criteria for truth.
See Neumaier [56] for a more rigorous discussion of this aspect.
For noncommuting effects, ‘and’ and ‘or’ ar undefined. One might think of
1
2
(ee′ + e′e) as a natural definition for e ∧ e′; however, this expression need
not be an effect (not even when both e, e′ are events), as the following simple
example shows:
e =
(
1 0
0 0
)
, e′ =
1
2
(
1 1
1 1
)
,
1
2
(ee′ + e′e) =
1
4
(
2 1
1 0
)
.
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7 Nonlocality
As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my
ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your
thoughts.
The LORD, according to Isaiah, ca. 540 B.C. [37]
Before they call I will answer; while they are still speaking
I will hear.
The LORD, according to Isaiah, ca. 540 B.C. [38]
A famous feature of quantum physics is its intrinsic nonlocality.
7.1 Example. In C4×4, the four matrices fj defined by
f1x =


x3
x4
x1
x2

 , f2x =


x2
x1
x4
x3

 , f3x =


x1
x2
−x3
−x4

 , f4x =


x1
−x2
x3
−x4


satisfy
f 2k ≤ 1 for k = 1, 2, 3, 4, (25)
and fj and fk commute for odd j − k. It is easily checked that in the pure
ensemble defined by the vector
ψ =


α1
−α2
α2
α1

 , α1,2 =
√
2±√2
8
,
we have
〈f1f2〉 = 〈f3f2〉 = 〈f3f4〉 = −〈f1f4〉 = 1
2
√
2. (26)
Since 〈fk〉 = 0 for all k, this implies that fj and fk are correlated for odd
j − k. On identifying 

x1
x2
x3
x4

 =
(
x1 x2
x3 x4
)
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and defining the tensor product action u⊗v : x 7→ uxvT , the matrices fj can
be written in terms of the Pauli spin matrices (10) as
f1 = σ1 ⊗ 1, f2 = 1⊗ σ1, f3 = σ3 ⊗ 1, f4 = 1⊗ σ3.
If we interpret the two terms in a tensor product as quantities related to
two spatially separated Fermion particles A and B, we conclude from (26)
that there are pure ensembles in which the components of the spin vectors of
two fermion particles are necessarily correlated, no matter how far apart the
two particles are placed, and no matter what was their past. Such nonlocal
correlations of certain quantum ensembles are an enigma of the microscopic
world that, being experimentally confirmed, cannot be removed by any in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics.
The nonlocal properties of quantum mechanics are usually expressed by so-
called Bell inequalities (cf. Bell [2], Clauser & Shimony [14]). The
formulation given here depends on the most orthodox part of quantum me-
chanics only; unlike in most expositions, it neither refers to hidden variables
nor involves counterfactual reasoning.
7.2 Theorem. Let fk (k = 1, 2, 3, 4) be Hermitian quantities satisfying (25).
(i) (cf. Cirel’son [12]) For every ensemble,
|〈f1f2〉+ 〈f3f2〉+ 〈f3f4〉 − 〈f1f4〉| ≤ 2
√
2. (27)
(ii) (cf. Clauser et al. [13]) If, for odd j − k, the quantities fj and fk
commute and are uncorrelated then we have the stronger inequality
|〈f1f2〉+ 〈f3f2〉+ 〈f3f4〉 − 〈f1f4〉| ≤ 2. (28)
Proof. (i) Write γ for the left hand side of (27). Using the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality and the easily verified inequality
√
α +
√
β ≤
√
2(α+ β) for all α, β ≥ 0,
we find
γ = |〈f1(f2 − f4)〉+ 〈f3(f2 + f4)〉|
≤
√
〈f 21 〉〈(f2 − f4)2〉+
√
〈f 23 〉〈(f2 + f4)2〉
≤ √〈(f2 − f4)2〉+√〈(f2 + f4)2〉
≤
√
2(〈(f2 − f4)2〉+ 〈(f2 + f4)2〉) =
√
4〈f 22 + f 24 〉 = 2
√
2.
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(ii) By Proposition 4.3(ii), vk := 〈fk〉 satisfies |vk| ≤ 1. If fj and fk commute
for odd j − k then Proposition 4.3(iv) implies 〈fjfk〉 = vjvk for odd j − k.
Hence
γ = |v1v2 + v3v2 + v3v4 − v1v4| = |v1(v2 − v4) + v3(v2 + v4)|
≤ |v1| |v2 − v4|+ |v3| |v2 + v4| ≤ |v2 − v4|+ |v2 + v4|
= 2max(|v2|+ |v4|) ≤ 2.
⊓⊔
For instance, in the above example, (26) implies that (27) holds with equality
but (28) is violated. Indeed, the assumption of (ii) is not satisfied.
The significance of the theorem stems from the fact that it implies that it
is impossible to prepare a classical ensemble for which the fi have the same
correlations as in Example 7.1, thus excluding the existence of local hidden
variable theories.
See Bell [2] for the original Bell inequality, Pitowsky [67] for a treatise
on Bell inequalities, and Aspect [1], Clauser & Shimony [14], Tittel
et al. [78] for experiments verifying the violation of (28).
8 Experiments
A phenomenon is not yet a phenomenon until it has been brought
to a close by an irreversible act of amplification [...] What answer
we get depends on the question we put, the experiment we arrange,
the registering device we choose.
John Archibald Wheeler, 1981 [81]
The literature on the foundations of physics is full of discussions of the mea-
surement process (Wheeler & Zurek [82]), usually in a heavily idealized
fashion (which might well be responsible for the resulting paradoxa). Mea-
surements such as that of the mass of top quarks or of neutrinos have a
complexity that in no way is covered by the traditional foundational mea-
surement discussions. To a lesser degree, this is also true of most other
measurements realized in modern physics.
Indeed, the values of quantities of interest are usually obtained by a combina-
tion of observations and calculations. For science, it is of utmost importance
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to have well-defined protocols that specify how to arrive at valid observa-
tions. Such standardized protocols guarantee that the observations have a
high degree of reproducibility and hence are objective.
On the other hand, these protocols require a level of description not appro-
priate for the foundations of a discipline. (E.g., we read a number from a
meter and claim having measured something only indirectly related to the
meter through theory far away from the foundations.)
We shall therefore formalize the notion of an experiment by taking into ac-
count only their most obvious aspect, and consider experiments to be assign-
ments of complex numbers v(f) to certain quantities f . This abstracts the
results that can be calculated from an experiment without entering the need
to discuss details of how such experiments can be performed. In particular,
the thorny issue of how the process of performing an experiment affects the
observations can be excluded from the foundations.
Our rudimentary but precise notion of experiment is sufficient to discuss
consistency conditions that describe how ‘good’ experiments should relate to
a physical theory, thus separating the basics from the complications due to
real experiments.
Since not all experiments allow one to assign values to all quantities, we
need a symbol ‘?’ that indicates an unspecified (and perhaps undefined)
value. Operations involving ? give ? as a result, with exception of the rule
0? =?0 = 0.
Apart from this, we demand minimal requirements shared by all reasonable
assignments in an experiment. For ‘good’ experiments, additional constraints
should be imposed – which ones are most meaningful will be analyzed in the
following. In particular, we look at the constraint imposed by ‘sharpness’.
8.1 Definition.
(i) A experiment is a mapping v : E→ C ∪ {?} such that
(S1) v(α+ βf) = α + βv(f) if α, β ∈ C,
(S2) v(f) ∈ R ∪ {?} if f is Hermitian;
it is called complete if v(f) ∈ C for all f ∈ E. v(f) is called the reference
value of f in the experiment v.
Ev := {f ∈ E | v(f) ∈ C}
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denotes the set of quantities with definite values in experiment v.
(ii) A set E of Hermitian quantities is called sharp in experiment v if, for
f, g ∈ E and λ ∈ R,,
(SQ0) R ⊆ E, v(f) ∈ R,
(SQ1) f 2 ∈ E, v(f 2) = v(f)2,
(SQ2) f−1 ∈ E, v(f−1) = v(f)−1 if f is invertible,
(SQ3) f ± g ∈ E, v(f + λg) = v(f) + λv(g) if f, g commute.
A quantity f is called sharp in v if Re f and Im f commute and belong to
some set that is sharp in experiment v.
Thus, sharp quantities behave with respect to their reference values precisely
as numbers would do (hence the name). In particular, sharp quantities are
normal by Corollary 2.4.
8.2 Examples. According to tradition, the best an experiment can do is to
detect the location of a classical system in phase space, or the wave function
of a quantum system. These ideal experiments are describes in the present
setting as follows.
(i) Classical mechanics. Classical few-particleparticle mechanics with N
degrees of freedom is described by a phase space Ωcl, the direct product
of RN × RN and a compact manifold describing internal particle degrees
of freedom. E is a subalgebra of the algebra B(Ωcl) of Borel measurable
functions on phase space Ωcl.
A classical point experiment is determined by a phase space point ω ∈ Ωcl
and the recipe
vω(f) :=
{
f(ω) if f is continuous at ω,
? otherwise.
In a classical point experiment v, all f ∈ Ev are sharp (and normal).
In classical probability theory, a point experiment is usually referred to as a
realization.
(ii) Nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. Nonrelativistic quantum me-
chanics of N particles is described by a Hilbert space H = L2(Ωqu), where
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Ωqu is the direct product of R
N and a finite set that takes care of spin, color,
and similar indices. E is the algebra of bounded linear operators on H. (If
unbounded operators are considered, E is instead an algebra of linear oper-
ators in the corresponding Schwartz space, but for this example, we do not
want to go into technical details.)
The Copenhagen interpretation is the most prominent, and at the same time
the most restrictive, interpretation of quantum mechanics. It assigns definite
values only to quantities in an eigenstate. A Copenhagen experiment is
determined by a wave function ψ ∈ H \ {0} and the recipe
vψ(f) :=
{
λ if fψ = λψ,
? otherwise.
In a Copenhagen experiment v, all normal f ∈ Ev (defined in (S2)) are sharp.
While well-defined value assignments model the repeatability of an experi-
ment and are indispensable in any objective theory, sharpness is a matter not
of objectivity but one of ‘point-like’ specificity of the assignments. Thus the
extent to which sharpness can be consistently assumed reflects a property
of the real world. Indeed, sharpness is the traditional characteristics of a
classical world with a commutative algebras of quantities.
We now investigate the properties of sharp quantities in general experiments.
It will turn out that total sharpness is incompatible with the existence of pairs
of spins: no experiment – in the very general setting defined here – can give
sharp values to all Hermitian quantities. Hence total sharpness contradicts
our knowledge of the world, another expression of the nonlocal nature of
reality.
Our first observation is that numbers are their own reference values, and that
sharp events are dichotomic – their only possible reference values are 0 and
1.
8.3 Proposition.
(i) v(α) = α if α ∈ C.
(ii) If e is a sharp event then v(e) ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. (i) is the case β = 0 of (S1), and (ii) holds since in this case, (SQ1)
implies v(e) = v(e2) = v(e)2. ⊓⊔
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8.4 Proposition. If the set E is sharp in the experiment v then
fg ∈ E, v(fg) = v(f)v(g) if f, g ∈ E commute, (29)
α + βf ∈ E, v(α+ βf) = α + βv(f) if f ∈ E, α, β ∈ R. (30)
Proof. If f, g ∈ E commute then f±g ∈ E by (SQ3). By (SQ1), (f±g)2 ∈ E
and v((f ± g)2) = v(f ± g)2. By (SQ3), fg = ((f + g)2− (f − g)2)/4 belongs
to E and satisfies
4v(fg) = v((f + g)2)− v((f − g)2) = v(f + g)2 − v(f − g)2
= (v(f) + v(g))2 − (v(f)− v(g))2 = 4v(f)v(g).
Thus (29) holds, and (30) follows from (29), (SQ0) and (SQ3). ⊓⊔
One of the nontrivial traditional postulates of quantum mechanics, that the
possible values a sharp quantity f may take are the elements of the spectrum
Spec f of f , is a consequence of our axioms.
8.5 Theorem. If a Hermitian quantity f is sharp in the experiment v, and
v(f) = λ then:
(i) λ− f is not invertible.
(ii) If there is a polynomial pi(x) such that pi(f) = 0 then λ satisfies pi(λ) = 0.
In particular, if f is a sharp event then v(f) ∈ {0, 1}.
(iii) If E is finite-dimensional then there is a quantity g 6= 0 such that fg =
λg, i.e., λ is an eigenvalue of f .
Proof. Note that λ is real by (SQ0).
(i) If g := (λ− f)−1 exists then by (30) and (SQ2), λ− f, g ∈ E and
v(λ− f)v(g) = v((λ− f)g) = v(1) = 1,
contradicting v(λ− f) = λ− v(f) = 0.
(ii) By polynomial division we can find a polynomial pi1(x) such that pi(x) =
pi(λ) + (x− λ)pi1(x). If pi(λ) 6= 0, g := −pi1(f)/pi(λ) satisfies
(λ− f)g = (f − λ)pi1(f)/pi(λ) = (pi(λ)− pi(f))/pi(λ) = 1,
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hence λ − f is invertible with inverse g, contradiction. Hence pi(λ) = 0. In
particular, this applies to an event with pi(x) = x2 − x; hence its possible
reference values are zeros of pi(x), i.e., either 0 or 1.
(iii) The powers fk (k = 0, . . . , dimE) must be linearly dependent; hence
there is a polynomial pi(x) such that pi(f) = 0. If this is chosen of minimal
degree then g := pi1(f) is nonzero since its degree is too small. Since 0 =
pi(λ) = pi(f) + (f − λ)pi1(f) = (f − λ)g, we have fg = λg. ⊓⊔
When E is a C∗-algebra, the spectrum of f ∈ E is defined as the set of
complex numbers λ such that λ− f has no inverse (see, e.g., [69]). Thus in
this case, part (i) of the theorem implies that all numerical values a sharp
quantity f can take belong to the spectrum of f . This covers both the case
of classical mechanics and that of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics.
Sharp quantities always satisfy a Bell inequality analogous to inequality
(28) for uncorrelated quantities:
8.6 Theorem. Let v be an experiment with a sharp set of quantities con-
taining four Hermitian quantities fj (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) satisfying f
2
j = 1 and
[fj , fk] = 0 for odd j − k. Then
|v(f1f2) + v(f2f3) + v(f3f4)− v(f1f4)| ≤ 2. (31)
Proof. Let vk := v(fk). Then (SQ2) implies v
2
k = v(f
2
k ) = v(1) = 1, and since
equation (29) implies v(fjfk) = vjvk for odd j − k, we find
γ = |v1v2 + v2v3 + v3v4 − v1v4|
= |v1(v2 − v4) + v3(v2 + v4)|
≤ |v1| |v2 − v4|+ |v3| |v2 + v4|
≤ |v2 − v4|+ |v2 + v4|
= 2max(|v2|+ |v4|) ≤ 2.
⊓⊔
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9 Which assumptions?
That so much follows from such apparently innocent assumptions leads us
to question their innocence.
John Bell, 1966 [3]
For example, nobody doubts that at any given time the center of mass of the
Moon has a definite position, even in the absence of any real or potential
observer.
Albert Einstein, 1953 [21]
In this section we discuss the question: Assuming there is a consistent, ob-
jective physical reality behind quantum physics which can be described by
precise mathematics, what form can it take?
Taking ’physical reality’ in our mathematical model as synonymous with
’being observable in an experiment’, the question becomes one of finding
natural consistency conditions for experiments which assign to all quantities
reference values which could qualify as the objective description of physical
reality – the ‘state’ of the system, the ‘beables’ of Bell [4].
The most popular conditions posed in the literature are equivalent to (or
stronger than) sharpness. But, in general, one cannot hope that every Her-
mitian quantity is sharp. Indeed, it was shown by Kochen & Specker [44]
that there is a finite set of events in C3×3 (and hence in any Hilbert space
of dimension > 2) for which any assignment of reference values leads to a
contradiction with the sharpness conditions. We give a slightly less general
result that is much easier to prove.
9.1 Theorem. (cf. Mermin [50], Peres [65])
There is no experiment with a sharp set of quantities containing four Hermi-
tian quantities fj (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) satisfying f
2
j = 1 and
fjfk =
{
−fkfj if j − k = ±2,
fkfj otherwise.
(32)
Proof. Let E be a set containing the fj . If E is sharp in the experiment v
then vj = v(fj) is a number, and v
2
j = v(f
2
j ) = v(1) = 1 implies vj ∈ {−1, 1}.
In particular, v0 := v1v2v3v4 ∈ {−1, 1}. By (29), v(fjfk) = vjvk if j, k 6= ±2.
Since f1f2 and f3f4 commute, v(f1f2f3f4) = v(f1f2)v(f3f4) = v1v2v3v4 = v0,
and since f1f4 and f2f3 commute, v(f1f4f2f3) = v(f1f4)v(f2f3)v1v4v2v3 = v0.
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Since f1f4f2f3 = −f1f2f3f4, this gives v0 = −v0, hence the contradiction
v0 = 0. ⊓⊔
9.2 Example. The 4 × 4-matrices fj defined in Example 7.1 satisfy the
relations required in Theorem 9.1. As a consequence, there cannot be an
experiment in which all components of the spin vectors of two Fermions are
sharp.
This implies that the sharpness assumption in Theorem 8.6 and in other
Bell-type inequalities for local hidden variable theories (see, e.g., the treatise
by Pitowsky [67]) fails not only in special entangled ensembles such as that
exhibited in Example 7.1 but must fail independent of any special preparation.
A similar interpretation can be given for a number of other arguments against
so-called local hidden variable theories, which assume that all Hermitian
quantities are sharp. (See Bernstein [5], Eberhard [19], Greenberger
et al. [27, 28], Hardy [30, 31], Mermin [50, 51], Peres [64, 65], Vaidman
[79]). For a treatment in terms of quantum logic, see Svozil [76].
While the above results show that one cannot hope to find quantum exper-
iments in which all Hermitian quantities are sharp, results of Clifton &
Kent [15] imply that one can achieve sharpness in E = Cn×n at least for a
dense subset of Hermitian quantities.
Since, as we have seen, experiments in which all Hermitian quantities are
sharp are impossible, we need to discuss the relevance of the sharpness as-
sumption for reference values that characterize experiments.
The chief culprit among the sharpness assumptions seems to be the squaring
rule (SQ1) from which the product rule (29) was derived. Indeed, the squar-
ing rule (and hence the product rule) already fails in a simpler, classical
situation, namely when considering weak limits of highly oscillating func-
tions, For example, consider the family of functions fk defined on [0, 1] by
fk(x) = α if ⌊kx⌋ is even and fk(x) = β if ⌊kx⌋ is odd. Trivial integration
shows that the weak-∗ limits are lim fk =
1
2
(α+ β) and lim f 2k =
1
2
(α2 + β2),
and these do not satisfy the expected relation lim f 2k = (lim fk)
2. Such weak
limits of highly oscillating functions lead to the concept of a Young measure,
which is of relevance in the calculus of variation of nonconvex functionals
and in the physics of metal microstructure. See, e.g., Roubicek [71].
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More insight from the classical regime comes from realizing that reference
values are a microscopic analogue of similar macroscopic constructions.
For example, the center of mass, the mass-weighted average of the positions
of the constituent particles, serves in classical mechanics as a convenient
reference position of an extended object. It defines a point in space with
a precise and objective physical meaning. The object is near this reference
position, within an uncertainty given by the diameter of the object. Similarly,
a macroscopic object has a well defined reference velocity, the mass-weighted
average of the velocities of the constituent particles.
Thus, if we define an algebra E of ‘intensive’ macroscopic mechanical quanti-
ties, given by all (mass-independent and sufficiently nice) functions of time t,
position q(t), velocity q˙(t) and acceleration q¨(t), the natural reference value
vmac(f) for a quantity f is the mass-weighted average of the f -values of the
constituent particles (labeled by superscripts a),
vmac(f) =
∑
a
maf(t, qa(t), q˙a(t), q¨a(t))
/∑
a
ma.
This reference value behaves correctly under aggregation, if on the right
hand side the reference values of the aggregates are substituted, so that it
is independent of the details of how the object is split into constituents.
Moreover, v = vmac has nice properties: unrestricted additivity,
(SL) v(f + g) = v(f) + v(g) if f, g ∈ E,
and monotony,
(SM) f ≥ g ⇒ v(f) ≥ v(g).
However, neither position nor velocity nor acceleration is a sharp quantity
with respect to vmac since (SQ1) and (SQ2) fail. Note that deviations from
the squaring rule make physical sense; for example, for an ideal gas in thermo-
dynamic equilibrium, vmac(q˙
2)− vmac(q˙)2 is proportional to the temperature
of the system.
From this perspective, and in view of Einstein’s quote at the beginning of
this section, demanding the squaring rule for a reference value is unwarranted
since it does not even hold in this classical situation.
Once the squaring rule (and hence sharpness) is renounced as a requirement
for definite reference values, the stage is free for interpretations that use
37
reference values defined for all quantities, and thus give a satisfying realistic
picture of quantum mechanics. In place of the lost multiplicative properties
we may now require unrestricted additivity (SL) without losing interesting
examples.
For example, the ‘local expectation values’ in the hidden-variable theory of
Bohmian mechanics (Bohm [7]) have this property, if the prescription given
for Hermitian quantities in Holland [35, eq. (3.5.4)] is extended to general
quantities, using the formula
v(f) := v(Re f) + iv(Im f)
which follows from (SL). Such Bohmian experiments have, by design,
sharp positions at all times. However, they lack desirable properties such as
monotony (SM), and they display other counterintuitive behavior. Moreover,
Bohmian mechanics has no natural Heisenberg picture, cf. Holland [35,
footnote p. 519]. (The reason is that noncommuting position operators at
different times are assumed to have sharp values.)
But a much more natural proposal comes from considering the statistical
foundations of thermodynamics.
10 Consistent experiments
One is almost tempted to assert that the usual interpretation in terms of
sharp eigenvalues is “wrong”, because it cannot be consistently maintained,
while the interpretation in terms of expectation values is “right”, because it
can be consistently maintained.
John Klauder, 1997 [43]
This means that the photon must have occupied a volume larger than the slit
separation. On the other hand, when it fell on the photographic plate, the
photon must have been localized into the tiny volume of the silver embryo.
Braginsky and Khalili, 1992 [9]
In the derivations of thermodynamics from statistical mechanics, it is shown
that all extensive quantities are expectations in a (grand canonical) ensemble,
while intensive quantities are parameters in the density determined by the
extensive quantities and the equation of state. Thus, from the macroscopic
point of view, ensembles seem to be the right objects for defining reference
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values. That what we measure reliably in practice to high accuracy are
usually also expectations (means, probabilities) points in the same direction.
Indeed, each ensemble defines a complete experiment by
v(f) := 〈f〉 for all f ∈ E,
for which (SL) and (SM) hold. For such experiments one even has a mean-
ingful replacement for the multiplicative properties: It follows from (19) that
there is an uncertainty measure
∆f =
√
v(f 2)− v(f)2 (33)
associated with each Hermitian quantity f such that
|v(fg)− v(f)v(g)| ≤ ∆f∆g for commuting Hermitian f, g. (34)
Thus the product rule (and in particular the squaring rule) holds in an ap-
proximate form.
For quantities with small uncertainty ∆f , we have essentially classical (nearly
sharp) behavior. Im particular, by the weak law of large numbers (Theorem
4.4), averages over many uncorrelated commuting quantities of the same kind
have small uncertainty and hence are nearly classical. This holds for the
quantities considered in statistical mechanics, and explains the emergence of
classical properties for macroscopic systems. Indeed, in statistical mechanics,
classical values for observed quantities are traditionally defined as expecta-
tions, and defining objective reference values for all quantities by means of
an ensemble simply extends this downwards to the quantum domain.
We therefore call an experiment v consistent if there is an ensemble 〈·〉 such
that
v(f) ∈ {〈f〉, ?} for all f ∈ E.
A complete consistent experiment then fully specifies a unique ensemble and
hence the ’state’ of the system.
10.1 Examples.
(i) The ground state of hydrogen. The uncertainty ∆q of the electron
position (defined by interpreting (33) for the vector q in place of the scalar
f) in the ground state of hydrogen is ∆q =
√
3r0 (where r0 = 5.29 · 10−11m
is the Bohr radius of a hydrogen atom), slightly larger than the reference
radius v(r) = 〈|q − v(q)|〉 = 1.5r0. The square of the absolute value of
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the wave function describes the electron as an extended object with fuzzy
boundaries described by a quickly decaying density, whose reference position
is the common center of mass of nucleus and electron.
(ii) The center of mass of the Moon. The Moon has a mass of mMoon =
7.35 · 1022 kg, Assuming the Moon consists mainly of silicates, we may take
the average mass of an atom to be about 20 times the proton mass mp =
1.67 ·10−27 kg. Thus the Moon contains about N = mMoon/20mp = 2.20 ·1048
atoms. In the rest frame of the Moon, the objective uncertainty of an atom
position (due to the thermal motion of the atoms in the Moon) may be
taken to be a small multiple of the Bohr radius r0. Assuming that the
deviations from the reference positions are uncorrelated, we may use (15)
to find as uncertainty of the position of the center of mass of the Moon a
small multiple of r0/
√
N = 3.567 · 10−35m. Thus the center of mass of the
Moon has a definite objective position, sharp within the measuring accuracy
of many generations to come.
With the assumption that the only experiments consistently realized in quan-
tum mechanics are the consistent experiments according to the above for-
mal definition, the riddles posed by the traditional interpretation of the mi-
croworld which imagines instead pointlike (sharp) properties, are significantly
reduced.
Quantum reality with reference values defined by consistent experiments is
as well-behaved and objective as classical macroscopic reality with reference
values defined by a mass-weighted average over constituent values, and lacks
sharpness (in the sense of our definition) to the same extent as classical
macroscopic reality.
Consistent experiments provide an elegant solution to the reality problem,
confirming the insistence of the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation on that
there is nothing but ensembles, while avoiding its elusive reality picture. It
also conforms to Ockham’s razor [60, 34], frustra fit per plura quod potest
fieri per pauciora, that we should not use more degrees of freedom than are
necessary to model a phenomenon.
Moreover, classical point experiments are complete consistent experiments,
and Copenhagen experiment are incomplete consistent experiments. Indeed,
whenever a Copenhagen experiment assigns a numerical value to a quantity,
the consistent experiment defined by the corresponding pure ensemble assigns
the same value to it. Thus both classical mechanics and the orthodox inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics are naturally embedded in the consistent
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experiment interpretation.
The logical riddles of quantum mechanics (see, e.g., Svozil [76]) find their
explanation in the fact that most events are unsharp in a given consistent
experiment, so that their objective reference values are no longer dichotomic
but may take arbitrary values in [0, 1], by (SM).
The arithmetical riddles of quantum mechanics (see, e.g., Schro¨dinger
[72]) find their explanation in the fact that most Hermitian quantities are
unsharp in a given consistent experiment, so that their objective reference
values are no longer eigenvalues but may take arbitrary values in the convex
hull of the spectrum.
Why then do we ’observe’ only discrete values when ’measuring’ quantities
with discrete spectra? In fact one only measures related macroscopic quan-
tities obtained by a thermodynamic magnification process that forces the
measurement apparatus (which interacts with the observed system) into an
equilibrium state: the dissipative environment selects the preferred basis in
which the ’collapse of the wave function’ happens; see the references at the
end of this section.
Then it is claimed (on the basis of knowing the form of the interaction be-
tween observing and observed system) that the accurate values of the macro-
scopic observables obtained are in fact an accurate measurement of corre-
sponding quantum ’observables’ of the observed system. But the relation
is indirect, and – as repetition shows – such a ’measurement’ is unreliable.
One gets a reproducible result – i.e., a reliable measurement of the quantum
system – only by averaging a large number of events.
Thus what is really (= reproducibly) observed about the quantum system is
its density, or rather the joint probability distribution of some of its quan-
tities. To deduce from this density a reference value for a quantity requires
taking an average, which is usually not in the spectrum. The same process
also explains how joint measurements of complementary variables such as
position and momentum are possible; this again yields a joint distribution
whose statistical properties are constrained by the uncertainty relation.
The geometric riddles of quantum mechanics – e.g., in the double slit ex-
periment (Bohr [8], Wootters & Zurek [86]) and in EPR-experiments
(Aspect [1], Clauser & Shimony [14]) – do not disappear. But they re-
main within the magnitudes predicted by reference radii and uncertainties,
hence require no special interpretation in the microscopic case. They simply
demonstrate that particles are intrinsically extended and cannot be regarded
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as pointlike.
(The extendedness of quantum particles has been mentioned in a number
of places, e.g., by Braginsky & Khalili [9] on nonrelativistic quantum
measurement theory (cf. the above quote), by Marolf & Rovelli on rela-
tivistic quantum position measurement. For relativistic particles, extended-
ness is unavoidable also for different reasons, since it is impossible to define
spacetime localization in a covariant manner. A lucid argument for this due
to Haag (unpublished) is presented in Keister & Polyzou [42, Section
4.4]; cf. also Foldy & Wouthuisen [25] and Newton & Wigner [59].
Extendedness also shows in field theory, where particles are excitations of
fields which are necessarily extended, except at special moments in time.)
When considering quantum mechanical phenomena that violate our geomet-
ric intuition, one should bear in mind similar violations of a naive geometric
picture for the classical center of mass, Einstein’s prototype example for a
definite and objective property of macroscopic systems: First, though it is
objective, the center of mass is nevertheless a fictitious point, not visibly dis-
tinguished in reality; for a nonconvex classical object it may even lie outside
its boundary! Second, the center of mass follows a well-defined, objective
path, though this path need not conform to the visual path of the object;
this can be seen by pushing a drop of dark oil through a narrow, strongly
bent glass tube.
Compare this with an extended quantum particle squeezing itself through a
double-slit, while its reference path goes through the barrier between the slits.
(What happens during the passage? I have never seen this discussed. But in
a detailed quantum description, the particle gets entangled with the double
slit and loses its individuality, emerging again – as an asymptotic scattering
state – unscathed only after the interaction has become negligible.)
Similarly, the fact that a particle hitting a screen of detectors excites only
one of the detectors does not enforce the notion of a pointlike behavior; an
extended flood also breaks a dam often only at one place, that of least re-
sistance. As the latter point may be unpredictable but is determined by the
details of the dam, so the detector responding to the particle may simply
be the one that is slightly easier to excite. The latter is determined by the
microstate of the detector but unpredictable, since the irreversible magnifi-
cation needed to make the measurement permanent enough to be reliable the
observed presupposes a sufficiently chaotic microstate (namely, according to
statistical mechanics, one in local equilibrium), whose uncertain preparation
is the source of the observed randomness.
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All the mathematical considerations above (though not all the illustrating
comments) are independent of the measurement problem. To investigate
how measurements of classical macroscopic quantities (i.e., expectations of
quantities with small uncertainty related to a measuring device) correlate
with reference values of a microscopic system interacting with the device
requires a precise definition of a measuring device and of the behavior of the
combined system under the interaction (cf. the treatments in Braginsky
& Khalili [9], Busch et al. [10, 11], Giulini et al. [26], Mittelstaedt
[53] and Peres [66]), and should not be considered part of an axiomatic
foundation of physics.
11 Dynamics
The lot is cast into the lap; but its every
decision is from the LORD.
King Solomon, ca. 1000 B.C. [74]
God does not play dice with the universe.
Albert Einstein, 1927 A.D. [20]
In this section we discuss the most elementary aspects of the dynamics of
(closed and isolated) physical systems. The goal is to show that there is no
difference in the causality of (nonrelativistic) classical mechanics and that of
quantum mechanics.
The observations about a physical system change with time. The dynamics
of a closed and isolated physical system is conservative, and may be described
by a fixed (but system-dependent) one-parameter family St (t ∈ R) of au-
tomorphisms of the *-algebra E, i.e., mappings St : E → E satisfying (for
f, g ∈ E, α ∈ C, s, t ∈ R)
(A1) St(α) = α, St(f
∗) = St(f)
∗,
(A2) St(f + g) = St(f) + St(g), St(fg) = St(f)St(g),
(A3) S0(f) = f, Ss+t(f) = Ss(St(f)).
In the Heisenberg picture of the dynamics, where ensembles are fixed and
quantities change with time, f(t) := St(f) denotes the time-dependent Hei-
senberg quantity associated with f at time t. Note that f(t) is uniquely
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determined by f(0) = f . Thus the dynamics is deterministic, independent of
whether we are in a classical or in a quantum setting.
(In contrast, nonisolated closed systems are dissipative and intrinsically sto-
chastic; see, e.g., Giulini et al. [26].)
11.1 Examples. In nonrelativistic mechanics, conservative systems are de-
scribed by a Hermitian quantity H , called the Hamiltonian.
(i) In classical mechanics – cf. Example 8.2(i) –, a Poisson bracket {·, ·}
together with H defines the Liouville superoperator Lf = {f,H}, and the
dynamics is given by the one-parameter group defined by
St(f) = e
tL(f),
corresponding to the differential equation
df(t)
dt
= {f(t), H}. (35)
(ii) In nonrelativistic quantum mechanics – cf. Example 8.2(ii) –, the
dynamics is given by the one-parameter group defined by
St(f) = e
−tH/ih¯fetH/ih¯,
corresponding to the Heisenberg equation
ih¯
df(t)
dt
= e−tH/ih¯[f,H ]etH/ih¯ = [f(t), H ]. (36)
If we write
f q g :=
{
−{f, g} for a classical system,
i
h¯
[f, g] for a quantum system,
we find the common description
f˙ = H q f. (37)
Indeed, it is well-known that the operation q satisfies analogous axioms
for a commutative (classical) respective noncommutative (quantum) Poisson
algebra; cf. [57, 80].
Thus the realization of the axioms is different in the classical and in the
quantum case, but the interpretation is identical.
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(iii) Relativistic quantum mechanics is currently (for interacting sys-
tems) developed only for scattering events in which the dynamics is restricted
to transforming quantities of a system at t = −∞ to those at t = +∞ by
means of a single automorphism S given by
S(f) = sfs∗,
where s is a unitary quantity (i.e., ss∗ = s∗s = 1), the so-called scattering
matrix, for which an asymptotic series in powers of h¯ is computable from
quantum field theory.
Of course, reference values of quantities at different times will generally be
different. To see what happens, suppose that, in a consistent experiment v
given by an ensemble, a quantity f has reference value v(f) at time t = 0.
At time t, the quantity f developed into f(t), with reference value
v(f(t)) = v(St(f)) = vt(f), (38)
where the time-dependent Schro¨dinger ensemble
vt = v ◦ St (39)
is the composition of the two mappings v and St. It is easy to see that vt is
again an ensemble, hence a consistent experiment.
Thus we may recast the dynamics in the Schro¨dinger picture, where quan-
tities are fixed and ensembles change with time. The dynamics of the time-
dependent ensembles vt is then given by (39). Of course, in this picture, the
dynamics is deterministic, too.
11.2 Examples.
(i) In classical mechanics, (35) implies for an consistent experiment of the
form
vt(f) =
∫
Ωcl
ρ(ω, t)f(ω)dω
the Liouville equation
ih¯
dρ(t)
dt
= {H, ρ(t)}.
(ii) In nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, (36) implies for an consistent
experiment of the form
vt(f) = tr ρ(t)f
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the von Neumann equation
ih¯
dρ(t)
dt
= [H, ρ(t)].
The common form and deterministic nature of the dynamics, independent
of any assumption of whether the system is classical or quantum, implies
that there is no difference in the causality of classical mechanics and that of
quantum mechanics. Therefore, the differences between classical mechanics
and quantum mechanics cannot lie in an assumed intrinsic indeterminacy
of quantum mechanics contrasted to deterministic classical mechanics. The
only difference between classical mechanics and quantum mechanics lies in
the latter’s lack of commutativity.
12 The nature of physical reality
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty
(i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity,
then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this
physical quantity.
Albert Einstein, 1935 [22]
Only love transcends our limitations. In contrast, our predictions can
fail, our communication can fail, and our knowledge can fail. For our
knowledge is patchwork, and our predictive power is limited. But when
perfection comes, all patchwork will disappear.
St. Paul, ca. 57 A.D. [62]
In a famous paper, Einstein, Podolsky & Rosen [22] introduced the
criterion for elements of physical reality just cited, and postulated that
the following requirement for a complete theory seems to be a necessary one:
every element of the physical reality must have a counterpart in the physical
theory.
Traditionally, elements of physical reality were thought to have to emerge
in a classical framework with hidden variables. However, to embed quan-
tum mechanics in such a framework is impossible under natural hypotheses
(Kochen & Specker [44]); indeed, it amounts to having ensembles in which
all Hermitian quantities are sharp, and we have seen that this is impossible
for quantum systems involving a Hilbert space of dimension 4 or more.
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However, expectations – the reference values of consistent experiments – are
such elements of physical reality: If one knows in an experiment v = v0
all reference values with certainty at time t = 0 then, since the dynamics
is deterministic, one knows with certainty the reference values (38) at any
time. In this sense, consistent experiments provide a realistic interpretation
of quantum mechanics, consistent also with Einstein’s intuition about the
nature of reference states.
This is emphasized by the fact that, as shown, e.g., in Marsden & Ratiu
[49, Example 3.2.2], it is possible to view the Ehrenfest theorem
d
dt
〈f〉 =
〈 i
h¯
[f, g]
〉
,
which follows from (37), as a classical symplectic dynamics for these elements
of physical reality – namely on the algebra whose elements (‘measurables’)
are all sufficiently nice functions of expectations of arbitrary quantities.
The deterministic dynamics of the reference values appears to be in conflict
with the non-deterministic nature of observed reality. This conflict can be
resolved by noting that a small subsystem M (a measuring apparatus) of a
large quantum system (the universe) can ’observe’ of another (small or large)
subsystem S of interest only the effect of the interaction of S on the state
of M . This limits the quality of the observations made. In particular, we
cannot not observe the objective reference values but only approximations,
with uncertainties depending on the size of the observed (and the observing)
system.
Thus we conclude that the true ’observables’ of a physical system are not the
(Hermitian) quantities themselves, as in the traditional interpretation, but
expectations of quantities. This is consistent with the fact that probabilities
(i.e., expectations of events) and other statistical quantities are measured (in
the wide sense, including calculations) routinely, and as accurately as the law
of large numbers allows.
In particular, the long-standing question ’what is probability on the level of
physical reality’ gets the answer, ’the result of measuring an event’. This
answer (given in a less formal context already by Margenau [47, Section
13.2]) is as accurate as the answer to any question relating theoretical con-
cepts and physical reality can be. It gives probability an objective interpre-
tation precisely to the extend that objective protocols for measuring it are
agreed upon. Here, objectivity is seen as a property of cultural agreement
on common protocols, and not as something inherent in a concept.
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The subjectivity remaining lies in the question of deciding which protocol
should be used for accepting a measurement as ’correct’. Different protocols
may give different results. Both classically and quantum mechanically, the
experimental context needed to define the protocol influences the outcome.
In particular, there is a big difference between measuring (in the wide sense,
including calculations) an event before (predicting) or after (analyzing) it
occurs. This is captured rigorously by conditional probabilities in classical
probability theory, and nonrigorously by the ’collapse of the wave function’
in quantum physics. Recognizing the ’collapse’ as the quantum analogue of
the change of conditional probability when new information arrives removes
another piece of strangeness from quantum physics.
If a state is completely known then everything (all elements of physical re-
ality, i.e., all reference values for consistent experiments) can be predicted
with certainty, both in the quantum and in the classical case. But, in both
cases, this only holds for an isolated system. In practice, physical systems
(especially small, observed systems) are never isolated, and hence interact
with the environment in a way we can never fully control and hence know.
This, and only this, is what introduces unpredictability and hence forces us
to a probabilistic description. And a change in the amount of information
available to us to limit our uncertainty is modeled by conditional probability
or its quantum equivalent, the ’collapse’.
To deepen the understanding reached, one would have to create a theory of
measurement that allows to evaluate the quality of measurement protocols
based on modeling both the observer and the observed within a theoretical
model of physical reality, and comparing the results of a protocol executed
in this model with the values it is claimed to measure. While this seems
possible in principle, it is a much more complex undertaking that lies outside
the scope of an axiomatic foundation of physics, though it would shed much
light on the foundations of measurement.
Taking another look at the form of the Schro¨dinger dynamics (38), we see that
the reference values behave just like the particles in an ideal fluid, propagating
independently of each other. We may therefore say that the Schro¨dinger
dynamics describes the flow of truth in an objective, deterministic manner.
On the other hand, the Schro¨dinger dynamics is completely silent about
what is true. Thus, as in mathematics, where all truth is relative to the
logical assumptions made (namely what is considered true at the beginning
of an argument), in theoretical physics truth is relative to the initial values
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assumed (namely what is considered true at the beginning of time).
In both cases, theory is about what is consistent, and not about what is
real or true. The formalism enables us only to deduce truth from other
assumed truths. But what is regarded as true is outside the formalism, may
be quite subjective (unless controlled by social agreement on protocols for
collecting and maintaining data) and may even turn out to be contradictory,
depending on the acquired personal (or collective social) habits of self-critical
judgment. The amount of objectivity and reliblilty achievable depends very
much on maintaining high and mature standards in conducting science.
What we can possibly know as true are the laws of physics, general rela-
tionships that appear often enough to see the underlying principle. But
concerning the ’state of the world’ (i.e., in practice, initial or boundary con-
ditions) we are doomed to idealized, more or less inaccurate approximations
of reality. Wigner [84, p.5] expressed this by saying, the laws of nature are
all conditional statements and they relate only to a very small part of our
knowledge of the world.
13 Epilogue
The axiomatic foundation given here of the basic principles underlying the-
oretical physics suggests that, from a formal point of view, the differences
between classical physics and quantum physics are only marginal (though in
the quantum case, the lack of commutativity requires some care and causes
deviations from classical behavior). In both cases, everything derives from
the same assumptions simply by changing the realization of the axioms.
As shown in [57], this view extends even to the deepest level of physics,
making classical field theory and quantum field theory almost twin brothers.
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